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Questions 
• The rationale and business case for worker representation.  
• What different channels for worker representation have been used, including but not limited to 
trade unions? 
• What are the advantages and disadvantages of these different channels and conditions 
required for effectiveness.  
• Best practice in strengthening worker representation (including e.g. tech-based approaches), 
and evidence of outcomes/results.  
• Challenges, risks, opportunities and entry points for donor engagement.  
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1. Summary 
This rapid review synthesises the literature from academic, policy, and knowledge institution 
sources on the different channels to strengthen worker representation in low- and middle-income 
countries (LMICs). Most of the literature on worker representation (a way to increase workers’ 
voice) comes from high-income countries. Where relevant for LMICs, some of this literature is 
used in this rapid review. Evidence from LMICs, mainly comes from the more industrialised 
middle-income countries, mainly in Latin America, but also in South Africa, India and 
Bangladesh, while few evidence comes from low-income countries. 
Overall, the evidence that makes a ‘business case’ for worker representation shows the 
following:  
 Workers income and wellbeing: Trade union members have higher wages than non-
union members through collective bargaining. However, the literature also shows that 
collective agreements in many LMICs have low collective bargaining rates and focus 
mainly on wage settings, leaving room for interpretation and real wage determination on 
individual level.  
 Firm productivity and trust: Higher wages are often paid back through an increase in 
productivity at firm-level. It seems that effective employee engagement strategies (or 
meaningful participation) positively relates to affective organisational commitment and 
trust, which result in higher level of activity, initiative and responsibility. Therefore, 
approaches that link incentives for productivity growth with higher wages on firm-level 
seem promising. Furthermore, Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) in lead firms is 
increasingly linked with improved worker representation in suppliers’ factories. Both 
supplier firms and their workers have benefitted as firms take measures to enhance 
worker satisfaction while the reduced employee turnover has a positive impact on firm 
performance and productivity. 
 Risk management: The literature shows strong research evidence of positive 
association between trade union supported health and safety representatives and 
improved health and safety outcomes in many sectors, in particular in high-income 
countries.  
 Inclusive economic development: Some scholars mention that the presence of strong 
unions reduce income inequality and that it was instrumental in maintaining democracy, 
economic order, and social stability in times of crises. Worker representation is also 
linked with more gender equality through the involvement of women in collective 
bargaining and other negotiations.  
This rapid review has identified four alternative channels of worker representation, beside the 
traditional trade unions: 
 Non-union worker representation in high-performance work systems have the 
advantage of self-management and increased team-responsibility encouraging working 
motivation and productivity. Some see opportunities to find solutions to let trade unions 
engage with these new kind of workers’ representation at firm level. However, critics 
highlight that such representation only works for higher educated employees who might 
endure higher levels of stress. They also argue that workers in these work systems will 
debilitate and demobilise unions by embracing a managerial and individualistic agenda 
for work. 
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 Worker ownership schemes give workers voice and agency as profit sharing relates to 
more transparency and dialogue between workers and management. Workers 
satisfaction is higher which often lead to higher productivity. However, critics argue that 
worker ownership does not automatically increase meaningful participation or control 
over decision-making as it depends on the effectiveness of the governance structures 
and leadership models. 
 Self-organisation of informal workers in associations or cooperatives. Organising 
self-employed workers in the informal sector (e.g. associations and cooperatives) has 
increased recognition of their role in society and local economy. However, without links 
with trade unions, associations of informal wage workers particularly are often weak to 
negotiate any improvement in work conditions and wages.  
 Self-organisation of ‘self-employed’ workers in non-standard work. These worker 
groups or associations are often working via social media platforms to share information 
and for mobilisation. One advantage for emerging economies in the context of self-
organisation is that the platform economy is seen as an opportunity for many workers to 
formalise, since it can reduce the costs of formalisation and improve monitoring of 
economic activity through the digitalisation of transactions. However, the main concern is 
that the power asymmetry between workers and the platform due to technology is 
increasing, without clear legislation. 
This rapid review further looked at the common strategies to strengthen informal and formal 
workers representation. For the informal sector workers there is a role for supportive NGOs or 
other organisations to help start and build the capacity of informal workers’ organisations, but 
they must learn when and how to hand over the leadership and administration of these 
organisations to leaders elected by the membership. Building alliances or a platform for dialogue 
and cooperation is one of the most important ways to strengthen these workers. However, trade 
unions could still play an important role in strengthening worker associations, often through 
inclusion of informal workers into the legal framework that structures the collective bargaining 
regime and by organising an employing entity with which to bargain. Alternatively, they could 
provide ongoing support ranging from use of premises and facilities to assistance during 
negotiations.  
Associations of informal workers do not usually have experience with collective bargaining and 
may not have a strong tradition of member control. Therefore, capacity building and trainings are 
important tools for empowerment and voice raising. Such support is necessary, particularly in 
cases where worker representation is new, leaders and members have limited experience of 
organising, and workers with relatively low education are engaging on issues that are highly 
technical and complicated. The literature also shows that linking assistance not only to 
governance and organisation, but also in entrepreneurship skills in general helps trade unions to 
increase cooperation and meaningful participation with informal workers. 
Strengthening worker representation in the formal sector is mainly through social dialogue (bi- or 
tripartite). However, the labour market is increasingly formed with non-standard workers, in 
particular self-employed workers in unbalanced power relationships. The literature shows that the 
ways to strengthen their voice need to link with granting collective bargaining rights to some of 
these workers through tailored interventions in the labour law or explicit exemptions to the law 
prohibiting cartels. Unions have adapted their legal status to allow self-employed workers to 
become members, while others have created dedicated branches for non-standard workers. 
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Exchange of experiences that come from initial interventions and channels of organising these 
workers’ voices should be promoted.   
One way in which governments could help social partners to seize this opportunity would be 
through setting up common knowledge platforms to share practices and experiences among 
actors. According to the literature, strengthening such online worker groups need incentives to 
build and improve digital technology instant messaging applications, social media groups, online 
fora as well as online polls. Improving awareness raising and initiating direct support to these 
online communities could be considered, in particular in emerging economies.  
Finally, this rapid review found some donor evaluations of interventions to strengthen worker 
representation. Some observations from this literature show that the main focus of interventions 
are on export sectors in more industrialised countries, mainly in Asia (e.g. Bangladesh, Vietnam). 
Interventions mainly focus on formal sector jobs and often do not respond to needs and demands 
for worker/self-employed self-organisation in sub-Saharan Africa. Projects or programmes are 
mainly focussing on capacity building and creating dialogues (bi- and tripartite) with traditional 
stakeholders. Some important points from these evaluations are: 
 Sustainability is an issue, in particularly because of a lack of commitment from 
stakeholders.  
 Creating synergies and complementarities is recommended to increase effectiveness 
and impacts.  
 Organising worker representatives outside the existing unions on the firm level had the 
most success in gaining trust and improvement in working conditions and wages. Less 
effective were initiatives of employee participation through team leaders, or in some 
cases through trade unions.    
 The ability to be flexible and responsive to the needs of workers’ organisations in 
developing strength, independence and representativeness in a wide variety of 
economic, political and historic contexts.  
 Donors are increasingly supporting initiatives in collaboration with the private sector to 
engage with them in supply chain to increase worker representation in supply chains.  
 Capacity building should not only focus on workers, but also in some cases on training 
for middle management to deal with demands and needs from employees.    
2. The rationale for worker representation  
The rationale (or business case) for worker representation is often derived from the long-term 
experiences and research on the workings of labour institutions in high-income countries with 
stable institutions. The literature is much sparser on labour market institutions and their social 
and economic outcomes outside the Western world in Low- and Middle-Income Countries 
(LMICs) (Lamarche, 2015). Evidence from LMICs, mainly comes from the more industrialised 
middle-income countries, mainly in Latin America, but also in South Africa, India and 
Bangladesh, ignoring the evidence from many low-income countries. This could relate to low 
levels of institutionalisation of collective bargaining within these countries.1  
                                                   
1 Own observation from the author, based on the available literature. 
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Hermans et al. (2017) show in an ILO-ITUC research paper how worker representation through 
social dialogue contributes to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). They argue that by 
using the social dialogue, this contributes to better working conditions, workers’ rights and 
equality at work; better access to public goods and redistribution; economic growth and 
innovation; higher investments in environment and climate; better governance and workers’ 
participation in the economy. More in general, the arguments (theoretically and empirically 
tested) in favour or against worker representation, should be distinguished on three levels:  
 Impacts on workers’ income and wellbeing,  
 Impacts on firm-level performance and productivity, and  
 Relevance for achieving sustainable and inclusive economic development.  
 
1. Workers’ income and wellbeing:  
Torm (2018) shows, by looking at the union wage gap among small and medium non‐state 
manufacturing enterprises in Vietnam, that controlling for both worker and firm characteristics, 
there is evidence that union members earn higher wages than non‐members (9-22%), and are 
more likely to receive social benefits. A study on the impact of unions on workers for a large coal 
mining company in India not only shows improvement in wages and conditions of labour, but also 
that union-membership raises the status of the workers both in the industry and society, which is 
linked with enhancing social control in economic decision-making processes (Mishra, 2015). The 
unions provide extra services to their members as well as to the community to which they belong, 
like providing legal and financial advice and improving skills. 
A study on the introduction of democratically elected worker representatives in the Swedish 
fashion brand H&M first tier factories in Bangladesh shows that this move has increased the 
ability of workers to negotiate a fair wage directly with their employers (MFO, 2018). In 
comparison with other factory workers in the garment industry the ones that supply for H&M 
receive a pay stub with wage and pay details, while others do not. This is important to ensure 
workers are paid accordingly and in a transparent way. H&M workers also received a slightly 
higher wage per hour (US$0.39/hour), while working on average 4 hours less per week, which 
resulted in that H&M supplier workers could spend a bit more money on food and could reduce 
debts, in comparison with other factory workers. However, the MFO (2018) study also shows that 
there was no significant increase in trade union membership for the factory workers, concluding 
that workers are still not allowed or encouraged to become a member. 
Besamusca and Tijdens (2015) worked on a large-scale, multi-country and coded dataset of 249 
collective bargaining agreements from 11 developing countries. They conclude that while wages 
are an integral part of almost all collective agreements, the detail with which they are set is much 
lower than expected. The majority of collective agreements recognise the role of bargaining in 
wage settings, but do not commonly include pay scales and leave the determination of exact 
wages up to individual contracts, which makes it difficult to see how effective these agreements 
really are to improve wages. Besamusca and Tijdens (2015) also found that clauses on social 
security and access to health care are still not a self-evident chapter in each collective 
agreement. Clauses on work-family arrangements are relatively common, suggesting possibility 
of positive impacts on wellbeing.  
The impact on workers’ income and wellbeing not only depends on what is in the agreements, 
but also how much the coverage rate is of collective bargaining, which varies significantly 
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between developing countries. For the African countries where data was available, the coverage 
rate varies from 3% of total wage workers to 70%, with Burundi and Mauritania at the lower side 
and Senegal and Ethiopia at the higher side. In Asia and the Pacific, they range from 2% to 52% 
with data from eight countries, with only India and China at the higher end. In the Americas, the 
coverage rate ranges from 4% to 81% with data from 11 countries, with Chili, Peru and Colombia 
at the lower end, and Argentina, Cuba, Bolivia at the higher end (Besamusca & Tijdens, 2015; 
Lamarche, 2015).  
Most of the literature on the union wage premium comes from developed countries. For example, 
Barth et al. (2017) show for Norway that unionisation of workers result in higher wages, as it 
combines with productivity growth, and having the highest positive results for high productivity 
firms. Bryson (2014) noted that despite declining bargaining power, unions continue to generate 
a wage premium for their members. Unions often work in tandem with employers for mutual gain 
based on productivity growth. Bryson (2014, p.1) concluded: “Without unions bargaining 
successfully to raise worker wages, income inequality would almost certainly be higher than it is.” 
However, as union influence on wages has fallen, wage inequality has grown in many countries.  
2. Firm-level risk management, trust building and productivity:  
Productivity  
Empirical evidence is not extensive on how collective bargaining for higher wages impacts the 
overall productivity of firms in developing countries. The argument that is often made, is that 
channels of work representation can be viewed as mechanisms for efficient bargaining; by 
facilitating cooperation in the workplace and increasing the flow of information, they boost 
productivity. On the other hand, industry-level bargaining may lower productivity by restricting 
managerial flexibility in response to market changes. Evidence from Argentina and Uruguay 
shows that firm-level negotiations, in general, promote productivity increases more than sector-
level negotiations (Lamarche, 2015). At the Ghanaian Naara Rural Bank and Builsa Community 
Bank, employee participation in decision-making meant “decision implementation becomes easy, 
creates a good working environment, increases commitment and satisfaction on decisions taken” 
(Abdulai & Shafiwu, 2014, p.1). The study concluded that participation resulted in improved 
productivity. Godfrey et al. (2017) show for the South-African garment factories that in a difficult 
situation of increased international competition collective bargaining measures for higher wages 
that could relate to productivity growth and improved competitiveness of the manufacturer are 
important ways to search for long-term sustainability at the firm level.  
A study in the Indian garment factories shows that enabling voice of workers reduced turnover 
and absenteeism, particularly for the most disappointed workers (Adhvaryu et al., 2019). Another 
study in India’s service sector shows increasing workers voice in the organisation through 
effective employee engagement strategies is positively related to affective organisational 
commitment, which result in higher level of activity, initiative and responsibility (Jena et al., 2017). 
However, it should be regarded that only 8% of the employees in India are meaningfully engaged 
with their companies (Kohli & Grover, 2013). The research results from a study involving retail 
companies in Kenya clearly indicated that participatory decision making amongst the junior staff 
of the retail markets affects capability development, cohesion and trust, communication, staff 
retention and motivation by enhancing their performance (Oloo & Orwar, 2016). 
Again, most evidence comes from studies that are conducted in developed countries. These 
studies show that increases in union density leads to substantial increases in firm productivity. 
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For example, Barth et al. (2017) show this for Norway. Using cross-country data from the 
European Company Survey, Addison and Teixeira (2017) show that the expression of collective 
voice through workers councils may be construed as largely beneficial regarding strike incidence, 
the climate of industrial relations, sickness/absenteeism, employee motivation, and staff 
retention. However, they also noted that “any such optimistic evaluation is heavily qualified by 
union organisation and in particular workplace unionism. Establishment union density seemingly 
blunts the performance of employee workplace representation, elevating dissatisfaction at the 
expense of collaboration” (p.2).  
Other studies show that egalitarian decision-making at the work floor can be efficient as long as 
workers are proactively involved in decision-making (Leach, 2016). Organisations and 
enterprises democratically controlled by their workers also perform well in term of labour 
productivity. US-based firms with a participatory culture of decision-making have been shown to 
be more profitable and productive, with less employee turnover (Blasi et al. 2013). Conventional 
wisdom is that participatory democratic processes in organisations and enterprises only work in 
small entities at the local level, but not at a larger scale. However, some evidence shows that 
growth is possible while placing more autonomy and self-management in smaller units (Chen 
2016). Ghosh (2015, p.299) concludes that, “federated growth can enable an organisation to 
scale up while ensuring that the constituent village-level grassroots units remain at a 
manageable size”. Others mention that after firms change their ownership relations by giving 
some control and ownership to their workers, meaningful engagement and affective 
organisational commitment could rise (Lee, 2018; Thorpe et al., 2019).  
Risk management  
In the literature, risk management and worker representation are mostly linked with workplace 
safety and better health for workers. Organisations like the European Agency for Safety and 
Health at Work (EU-OSHA) have shown that a safer and healthier workplace could be linked with 
improved productivity, reduced absentees and reputational benefits. The literature shows strong 
research evidence of positive association between the presence of trade union supported health 
and safety representatives and improved health and safety outcomes in many sectors, in 
particular in high-income countries. For example, a comparative study examined the 
effectiveness of arrangements to give workers in the mining industry in Australia, Canada, India, 
Indonesia and South Africa a voice and influence on their employers’ arrangements for their 
safety and health in a global industry (Walters et al., 2018). The researchers demonstrate that 
worker representation matters for the outcomes; improved occupational safety and health 
performance in unionised coalmines is often the case in particular in Australia, Canada and 
South Africa, but not in India and Indonesia, where regulatory steer is weaker and unions have 
less influence.  
Risk management is also important in relation to the supply chain. Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) in lead firms is increasingly linked with improved worker representation in 
suppliers factories as illustrated in afore case of H&M. For example, Hofman et al. (2014) 
evaluated three projects with the participation of 40 supplier firms in the Chinese coastal 
provinces of Guangdong, Jiangsu and Zhejiang that represent multi-stakeholder efforts to take 
into account the interests of workers by providing alternative channels through which workers 
can voice their concerns. They concluded that both supplier firms and their workers have 
benefitted as firms take measures to enhance worker satisfaction while the reduced employee 
turnover has a positive impact on firm performance and productivity. For their global buyers 
having these worker representation measures implemented at their suppliers increases not only 
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their performance, but also reduces reputational damage towards consumers and increases 
motivation of their own employees.  
However, it is important to note from the remarks of Guo (2012) that although CSR in global 
value chains has impact on worker representation, in particular in the cases of long-term 
commitments and cooperation for meaningful worker participation, CSR in Chinese firms is 
mostly driven by buyers’ codes of conduct and thus largely externally imposed. This has resulted 
in minimum efforts and investments, mostly for reasons of image, in order to maintain a harsh 
labour regime. 
Stability and trust  
Most of the literature on trust is based on firm-level empirical evidence, claiming that where 
worker representatives are engaged in a constructive dialogue with the employer or managers, 
trust levels go up, which could result in better firm performances. Less is known about the overall 
impact of worker representation on stability and trust within the broader economy. Lamarche 
(2015, p.2) noted: “[I]n Argentina, the presence of strong unions was instrumental in maintaining 
democracy, economic order, and social stability when GDP fell 18% during the 2001–2002 
recession”. Blanchard et al. (2013) argued that trust appears to be just as important in bringing 
macro flexibility as the structure of collective bargaining as the effectiveness of co-ordination, in 
particular, is likely to be closely linked to relatively peaceful and co-operative industrial relations. 
IMF (2016) shows that unemployment rose less following the global financial crisis in those 
countries where trust between employees and employers was high, resulting in stability for the 
firms and for the whole economy. 
3. Sustainable and inclusive economic development:  
Inclusive economic development 
In emerging economies, some evidence suggests that collective bargaining resulted in less 
inequality. In Brazil, for example, the government of former president Lula included organised 
labour and business in discussions on reforms to the labour code as well as increases in the 
national minimum wage. As Berg and Schneider (2018) show, the reinvigoration of the minimum 
wage policy and the introduction of the Executive Order in 2004 concerning Profits and Results 
(PLR), which provided an incentive to increase productivity in the form of a collectively negotiated 
bi-annual non-taxable bonus payment to workers, had a favourable influence on collective 
bargaining. Berg and Schneider (2018) concluded that in turn this industrial collaboration 
delivered real wage increases and compressed the wage distribution. Overall, the increase in the 
minimum wage and the extension of workers’ rights to domestic workers through increased 
worker participation played an important role in reducing income inequality, while collective 
action did not act as a brake on development.  
Such outcomes are not often related directly to increased work participation and voice, because 
of the complexity of political economy and macro-economic dynamics. For example, in South 
Africa, collective bargaining has compressed wage structures and reduced wage inequality 
among those covered. However, high unemployment and rising inequality has limited the 
potential contribution of these institutions to inclusive development (Hayter, 2018). Hayter noted 
a paradox: while organised labour gained institutional and organisational power in Brazil and 
South Africa, and was able to influence broader economic and social policies, this has not 
necessarily been accompanied by institutional deepening in respect of employment relations at 
the workplace. It has even resulted in “an observable increase in spontaneous non-procedural 
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protests, disputes and work stoppages” (p.21). For example, despite the institutionalisation of 
industrial relations and highly regarded dispute resolution processes and institutions, in 2016, 
59% of strikes were unprotected in South Africa (Hayter & Pons-Vignon, 2018). The authors 
argue that the lack of broader economic and social transformation and high dependency ratios 
weigh heavily on the bargaining agenda and are placing pressure on the industrial relations 
system. 
Gender equality  
Trade unions all around the world have recognised the need to address women’s participation 
and representation in the labour market. Britwum and Ledwith (eds., 2014), for example, show 
evidence of dedicated funding for women’s participation within the unions. However, often with 
reliance on foreign support. For example in Brazil, Ghana and Zimbabwe, all were able to 
develop gender programmes because of resourcing from foreign sister unions and NGOs. 
Britwum and Ledwith (eds., 2014) mentioned that in the 1990s in Brazil, women went on to 
secure positions on the direction board of the national confederation, CUT, with a full-time 
woman in charge of gender issues. Building on these and other successes, equality of 
opportunity became a constant on bargaining agendas and the banking sector was the first to 
achieve a collective agreement.  
Serrano and Certeza (2014) confirm that indeed, successes and equality initiatives would not 
have been included in agreements, but for the involvement of women. That women need to be 
involved in the actual negotiations and that their input behind the scenes, doing research, 
formulating bargaining proposals and being involved in working parties, has also shown to result 
in equality measures being included in agreements. Furthermore, empirical research shows that 
women develop different agendas from the traditional male workers’ ones. In this way, the 
presence of women not only transforms the bargaining process, the interpretation and 
implementation of the claims, but also helps to undermine the prevailing hegemonic ideology of 
the male breadwinner model (Yilmaz, 2014). However, Yilmaz (2014) also shows for Turkey that 
very tight legal restrictions on Turkish unions mean that unions have to spend much effort to 
develop bargaining agendas for gender. She identifies how only one confederation in Turkey 
could be identified as gender sensitive, and that this may be due to it being a public sector union 
with a relatively high proportion of women members.  
For the Philippines, Serrano and Certeza (2014) point out how the continuing decline in 
unionisation, particularly in labour-intensive industries where women are concentrated, and 
women’s representation deficit in the unions, put women at a disadvantage in bargaining for 
higher wages and better working conditions. Where there is a union policy allocating a certain 
proportion of the collective bargaining team to women and gender/women-related policies, this is 
strongly related to inclusion of maternity leave beyond the legal minimum. Overall, Serrano and 
Certeza (2014) concluded that when women are substantially represented (or comprise the 
majority) in union leadership and in the bargaining team, winning more collective bargaining 
provisions for women’s issues (particularly those that entail direct monetary costs for 
management, such as additional maternity leave, menstrual leave and day care facilities) tends 
to be more likely. 
Environmental impacts 
No literature could be found for this rapid review on worker representation and positive 
environmental impacts for developing countries. Some studies from Germany suggest that their 
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might be some links between worker representation and increased environmental investment 
(JirJahn & Smith, 2017). A study in France did a large cross-section of French firms and found 
strong associations between profit sharing with workers and various innovations with 
environmental benefits (Fakhfakh & FitzRoy, 2018). They argue that the relationship between 
profit sharing and environmental innovation is plausible, “since workers benefit more than outside 
owners from a better local environment” (p.1). For Germany, using panel data, Askildse et al. 
(2006) found a positive and robust association between worker representation and environmental 
investment. This evidence could mean that worker representation has broader welfare 
implications that go beyond the workforce of a single firm (JirJahr & Smith, 2017). However, most 
literature is theoretically and empirical evidence is still scarce. The study of Fakhfakh and 
FitzRoy (2018), however, confirms the theory that workers and their community are affected by 
environmental hazards caused by the firm in which they work. Moreover, employees are willing 
to trade off wages or effort for reductions in environmental hazards, where worker representation 
forms an adequate mechanism to negotiate environmental investment (JirJahr & Smith, 2017).  
3. Towards alternative channels for worker representation  
A changing landscape 
The traditional format for worker representation is within the trade union. In continental Europe, 
sector-level agreements allow for some specific firm-level agreements, for example to allow less 
favourable measures on firm-level in times of crises or to leave scope for a firm-level agreement. 
In emerging economies sector-level agreements are more an exception of the rule, with most of 
these countries having only firm-level agreements (OECD, 2017). Firm-level representation of 
workers' interests takes several forms: local trade union representatives (which may or may not 
engage in firm-level collective bargaining), work councils, worker representatives or a 
combination of the three. 
Lamarche (2015) explains that in Asian countries, like in other emerging economies, collective 
bargaining has indeed shifted during the 1990s and start of 2000s to decentralisation, often 
resulting in bargaining at firm-level. However, he noticed that more recently, there is a trend in 
some Asian countries to organise again some aspects, like protecting non-permanent workers, 
on the sector level. Latin America has a longer tradition with industry-wide collective bargaining 
by trade unions, but also a trend of decentralisation has appeared, in particular in some countries 
like Chile, Peru, Mexico and Colombia.  
Traditional unions increasingly struggle to attract members all over the world. Ackers (2015) 
summarises six potential explanations for union decline in developed countries and the erosion 
of union collective bargaining:  
 Transition from industrial to post-industrial society, primarily but not solely driven by 
technological change. Strongholds of unions in manufacturing are being replaced by 
service and knowledge work in which unions have traditionally been absent or weak.  
 Economic globalisation and internationalisation, primarily driven by multi-national 
companies and liberalisation by governments. By integrating capital, product, service and 
labour markets, joint regulation by nation-bound unions becomes less eﬀective.  
 Emergence of ﬂexible ﬁrm and global value chains, primarily driven by companies. The 
new companies – most recently platform companies, such as Uber, Lyft or AirBnB – are 
less bound to speciﬁc locations and often require no formalised employment 
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relationships, making union recruitment and representation of workers costly, if not 
impossible.  
 The shift from class/occupation-based identities to consumer-based identities, reducing 
the appeal of unionism.  
 The rise of neoliberalism and discredit of socialism since 1989 have made the core 
values of unionism less attractive as a political narrative.  
 Strategic mistakes by unions have cost them power and inﬂuence.  
These trends have resulted in a reduction in union density across the OECD countries (Ibsen & 
Tapia, 2017). During the same period of lower levels of union membership, income inequality in 
many emerging economies and OECD countries have risen and the standard employment 
contract is in decline, with precarious forms of employment becoming more prevalent in almost 
every country in the world (Ibsen & Tapia, 2017). This trend is called ‘precarisation’ (Standing, 
2011), which is partly an outcome of flexible company forms and fuelled by deregulation of labour 
law in pursuit of flexible labour markets. Scholars (divided by ‘pluralists’, ‘radicals’ and ‘unitary’) 
on the issue of worker representation give different answers to the degree the demise of the 
trade union has influenced this. However, there is consensus that it is an important factor.  
LMICs face the same challenges of globalisation, the decline of the manufacturing sector (Latin 
America and Africa), and the expansion of flexible forms of work, which increases to some extent 
individualisation of employment relationships (Quak & Van der Vijsel, 2013). For the formal 
industries in India, Maiti (2019) showed that that increased international trade has dampened the 
bargaining power of labour, and as a result has reduced labour share. Because most productive 
firms need fewer workers, the drop in demand weakens bargaining power and shifts away 
distributive share from workers.  
Furthermore, the demise of trade unions in many LMICs relate to the shrinking space for civil 
society in general, and disruptive politicisation and corruption within unions, and limited 
capacities. For example, Firmin and Van Severen (2017) mention several barriers for civil society 
organisations (CSOs) which relate to the question why unions are struggling in many LMICs:  
 CSO formation: Laws and regulations on the formation and registration of CSOs are 
often complex, expensive and politicised. There are many concerns about the neutrality 
of registration procedures.  
 CSO operation: Governments could insist that CSOs align with their priorities and 
programmes. This undermines the autonomy of CSOs.  
 Freedom of assembly: State agencies and security forces often abuse their powers and 
intervene to prevent or disrupt assemblies. Decisions on whether assemblies can 
proceed may be made on political grounds, and penalties for assembly organisers can be 
excessive.  
 Freedom of expression: Constitutional guarantees on the freedom of expression are 
often undermined, including by recently introduced anti-terrorism laws in several 
countries. Internet freedom is becoming more contested, and subject to new legislation 
that is often not enabling. 
 Access to resources: CSOs in many countries see their resourcing environment as 
declining or very difficult, with core resourcing particularly strained. In several countries 
the withdrawal of bilateral donors is causing difficulties. 
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 Civil society-government relations: Most often relationships are sporadic and ad hoc, 
with varying patterns of engagement across different areas and layers of government. 
This raises the question of how open dialogue opportunities are to a wide range of civil 
society. 
In general, this rapid review observes six major trends in worker representation for developing 
countries, on which many alternative channels of worker representation have emerged, and the 
next section will elaborate further on:2 
 Informal sector workers’ self-organisation: The informal sector in developing 
countries get better organised, in particular in urbanised regions in emerging economies, 
like Brazil and India.  
 Self-management and innovative organisational and governance structures in 
firms to increase voice and agency of workers: Social enterprises, community-based 
firms and cooperatives often have stakeholder participation implemented within the core 
of the organisation, giving workers often ownership and voice in important decision-
making.  
 Increasing role of grassroots organisations and civil society in bargaining for 
workers’ rights and engagement: Involvement of NGOs, civil society or grassroots 
organisations in organising labour, improving labour rights by increasing voice and 
agency.   
 Individualisation of the employment relationship in the context of the digital 
transformation and development of the digital platforms: Although this is mainly the 
case in high-income countries, the use of digital platforms to find self-employed work (in 
the gig-economy) is now expending rapidly in developing countries, and requires new 
forms of self-organisation.  
 Corporate Social Responsibility within the supply chain: Worker representation is 
often initiated and maintained through push factors of lead firms within the supply chain 
(see more in box 1). 
 Internationalisation of worker representation: With international trade and 
competitiveness on the rise, worker representation also goes international, increasing the 
voice of workers from the local level to special global platforms of decision-making (see 
more in box 2). 
Box 1. Linking worker representation with global supply chains 
Global supply chains have placed growing attention on how multinationals can be held accountable for 
monitoring and improving labour conditions in their global suppliers. CSR is increasingly a way multinational use 
to improve voice of workers in their supply chain. They often do this together with civil society organisations and 
grassroots organisations (Tapia et al., 2015). They campaign for the right to set up associations and campaign 
for workers’ rights. They also work together with private sector actors, governments and trade unions to improve 
worker representation in value chains (e.g. Ethical Trade Initiative). For example, in the case of the Cambodian 
beer promoters, beer companies hire women on an informal basis, and often on commission, to promote their 
brands in bars and restaurants not owned or managed by the companies. The result is that these informal 
workers are exposed to sexual harassment and assault, which alerted NGOs and labour organisations both 
                                                   
2 Authors observation based on the available literature. 
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within and outside of Cambodia who pressed for an industry code of conduct, which led to the formalisation of 
beer promoters under the protection of Cambodian labour law (Eaton et al. 2017).  
In many LMICs, there is often no effective and independent worker representation in export zones or export 
industries. Trade unions are not influential, membership is discouraged, often there are no strict labour laws in 
place, or if so, there is a lack of implementation. Multinationals have the power to push worker representation in 
the supply chain and create cooperation opportunities with NGOs and grassroots organisations to facilitate 
capacity building and monitoring.  
However, other scholars often mention that CSR is a form of ‘private governance’, often bypassing an active role 
for the state. It is a voluntary form of regulation implemented by firms or industry groups. “Due to the absence of 
labour or the state as an actor as well as the importance of networks rather than single firms, we need to 
reassess to what extent our established IR [Industrial Relations] theories can explain the conditions under which 
CSR can be an effective tool for worker voice” (Tapia et al., 2015, p.166). Radical Industrial Relations theorists 
go a step further and predict CSR will be used as a strategic tool by the company not just to enhance their 
performance, but to defeat trade unions, supress worker voice and bypass state regulation as voluntary, firm-
driven CSR practices are seen as ways to control the workers (Costas & Kärreman, 2013), to legitimate the firms’ 
reputation, purposely excluding labour as an actor as well as excluding any form of worker voice as a topic of 
their CSR strategy. 
Alternative channels for worker representation 
New forms of social dialogue, collective organisation and bargaining are emerging to meet the 
challenges posed by new forms of work (OECD, 2017).This rapid review identified four 
alternative channels for worker representation outside the traditional worker representation, 
which is affiliated or fully integrated within trade unions: 
1. Non-union worker representation in high-performance work systems:  
Workers organise themselves in worker councils or independent workers groups at the firm level 
without direct links with trade unions. Groups of workers also could organise themselves in sub-
sections within larger firms that link with self-management and new forms of team decision-
making (e.g. SEMCO in Brazil). Moreover, in this kind of “high-performance work systems”3 
workers deal more in an individual way with their work relations with their employer (Tapia et al., 
2015).  
Advantages: Arguments in favour or against depend from the point of view of scholars. Unitary 
scholars have more in favour of more individual non-institutional workers’ participation. They 
argue that the effectiveness of high-performance work systems hinges on the degree of worker 
involvement that spurs worker motivation. “Thus, we might actually find work systems that yield 
high performance which remain ‘lean and mean’ in terms of HR practices and therefore poor 
alternatives to unions for worker interests” (Tapia et al. 2015, p.164). In this perspective, flexibility 
and responsibility are the drivers on which workers increase control and voice. The pluralists 
scholars, who are in favour of institutionalisation and involvement of trade unions, are divided. 
                                                   
3 The handbook of Human Resource Management Practice, authored by Michael Armstrong (2012) has one chapter dedicated 
to high-performance work systems (HPWS). It shows that such systems facilitate employee involvement, skill enhancement and 
motivation. High performance is a way of organising work so that front-line workers participate in decisions that have a real 
impact on their jobs and the wider organisation. Such systems are based on both alternative work practices and high-
commitment employment practices. Information retrieved from 
https://nscpolteksby.ac.id/ebook/files/Ebook/Business%20Administration/ARMSTRONGS%20HANDBOOK%20OF%20HUMAN
%20RESOURCE%20MANAGEMENT%20PRACTICE/13%20-%20High-perfomance%20Work%20Systems.pdf 
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One part is not per se against this organisational restructuring, but they see an opportunity to find 
solutions to let trade unions engage with these new kind of workers’ representation at firm level. 
Disadvantages: The critics (e.g. pluralist and radicals) argue that it only works for mostly higher 
educated workers. Furthermore, while employees might be granted more discretion, they might 
endure higher levels of stress at the same time due to the responsibility of individual decision-
making. They criticise studies on high-performance work systems for failing to take adequate 
account of the broader political-economic context and the effects on employees. Scholars also 
argue that workers in these work systems will debilitate and demobilise unions by embracing a 
managerial and individualistic agenda for work (Tapia et al., 2015). 
2. Worker ownership:  
Giving workers voice and agency can also be organised through ownership schemes to workers. 
In most cases worker representatives (democratically elected) are part of the board and have 
regular meetings with management. In such cases, employee participation and representation 
and worker ownership go often hand in hand and could enhance workers’ trust in the firm, which 
in turn promotes commitment to performance and innovation at workplace (Lee, 2018). 
Advantages: Worker ownership and profit sharing relate to more transparency and dialogue 
between workers and management. Worker ownership creates incentives to be more informed in 
decision-making processes and increases long-term commitments of workers. Workers 
satisfaction is higher which often lead to higher productivity (Lee, 2018). Problems or grievances 
are often solved directly through dialogues.  
Disadvantages: Arguments against are often the slow decision-making process to react or adapt 
quickly to changes. However, recent studies show that this depends more on the effectiveness of 
the governance structures and leadership models (Rothschild, 2016). In line with this, worker 
ownership does not automatically increase meaningful participation or control over decision-
making. Worker representatives could be part of the board, but this not often means that they 
have a final say in strategic decision-making.  
3. Self-organisation of informal workers in associations or cooperatives:  
There are various examples of different kind of efforts to organise informal workers’ 
representation in a bid to improve their status, income, working, and support a ‘formalisation’ 
process. The organisational forms in which informal workers are organised varies per case; there 
are federations absorbing informal workers, as well as national centres affiliating informal 
economy unions and associations, informal workers’ associations simply cooperating with unions 
and civil society organisations, self-help group or hybrid form. Chen et al. (2015) noted that for 
registered organisations, their legal form is often dictated by what is possible under the 
regulations of their respective countries, and may, therefore, differ from their de facto structure, 
strategies and activities.   
Advantages: Organising self-employed workers in the informal sector (e.g. associations and 
cooperatives) has increased recognition of their role in society and local economy. Through this 
improved visibility and recognition these workers can improve some conditions in which they 
work (e.g. domestic worker, street vendors, and waste pickers), access to micro-finance through 
their own saving and borrowing activities in their cooperatives (e.g. SACCO in Kampala for street 
sweepers), and increased regional networks to share information and good practices (Chen et 
al., 2015; Budlender, 2013).  
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Disadvantages: The literature is less clear about self-organisation of wage workers in the 
informal sector without affiliation with unions. Without links with trade unions, these associations 
are often weak to negotiate any improvement in work conditions and wages. Because they work 
in the informal sector, the firms are not registered and often small without any governance 
structures to increase voice or grievance systems (Eaton et al., 2017). Therefore, trade unions in 
LMICs are often with support from NGOs or donor agencies working on schemes to include 
informal wage workers, however, with mixed results (see more in section 4).    
4. Self-organisation of ‘self-employed’ workers in non-standard work:  
Evidence in high-income countries shows an emerging call for representation of self-employed 
workers (non-standard workers) setting up new unions or associations, like the Freelancers 
Union and Worker Centers in the United States or platform workers groups emerging in Europe. 
To date, the debate surrounding platform work has largely focused on more advanced 
economies, where the emergence of platforms has sparked concerns about ‘precarisation’ of 
labour, challenges for social protection and, more generally, for job quality (OECD, 2019). 
Traditional trade unions are increasingly taking up efforts to engage with these groups, such as 
the German IG Metall with the FairCrowdWork or the German independent service union ver.di, 
among many (OECD, 2017). In some cases, as the OECD (2017) report mentions (although very 
little is known about the effectiveness), without any (or only limited) pressure from unions or 
workers, companies extend the terms set in collective agreements for standard workers to non-
standard workers and/or engage voluntarily in collective bargaining to: gain recognition from 
social partners and improve labour relations; and co-define the regulation of the gig-economy 
and therefore limit state intervention. Although less attention goes to emerging economies, 
similar concerns are raised there on platform work with the rise of affordable mobile 
technologies.  
Advantages: The literature does not show one channel of organisation that is the most 
successful for these workers. In some cases, it is the digital platform itself that offers 
improvements due to groups of workers that raise concerns. In other cases, it are independent 
associations or trade unions that are involved in negotiations with the platform and in lobby 
activities towards governments for legislation. What is known is that these worker groups or 
associations are often working via social media platforms themselves to share information and 
for mobilisation. One advantage for emerging economies in the context of self-organisation is 
that the platform economy is seen as an opportunity for many workers to formalise, since it can 
reduce the costs of formalisation and improve monitoring of economic activity through the 
digitalisation of transactions. The OECD (2019) mention the case of motorcycle taxis that use 
rental platforms in Jakarta (e.g. GoJek, Grab Bike). The report mentions the study of Fanggidae 
et al. (2016), that highlights the role played by the platforms in facilitating access to social 
protection for workers. For example, GoJek offers help to its drivers to subscribe to the 
government health insurance programme, while at Grab Bike workers are automatically enrolled 
in the government's professional insurance programme. 
Disadvantages: The main concern of self-organisation, negotiating voluntary agreements and 
trade unions still struggling to organise platform workers within their organisation, is that the 
power asymmetry between workers and the platform due to technology is increasing, without 
clear legislation. Self-organisation is often too limited, the workers often only have a digital 
working relationship with distanced platform owners, and these groups are legally challenged to 
bargain collectively for these workers. However, there is recognition that with the right policies 
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and institutions in place, platform workers can be represented and organised better (OECD, 
2019).    
Box 2. Internationalisation of worker representation:  
Representation does not stop at the firm or industry-level, but is more often translated into global initiatives that 
include voice of workers. The UN Global COMPACT initiatives, for example, or at the ILO in Geneva, worker 
representatives are invited to take part at the negotiation table. At the Asian Development Bank, representatives 
of workers also gain voice in some decision-making processes. Furthermore, when markets and companies 
internationalise, worker representation must also internationalise. International framework agreements (IFAs) are 
mentioned as a solution. 
Worker representatives are part of global agenda settings and bring cases directly to the negotiation tables. IFAs 
have been regarded as important tools for providing workers a voice and negotiating with employers that operate 
in highly internationalised markets. These agreements represent the attempt to establish fundamental rights for 
workers, including the right to representation, in multinationals and, in many cases, their suppliers. A more 
pluralist perspective on IFAs looks at a broader set of factors that may explain whether IFAs will create space for 
new social dialogue, as well as a tool to forge coalitions with NGOs, other unions and social movements to 
organize workers around the globe (Tapia et al., 2015). 
However, the link between global platforms with the real struggles on the ground is still large. Recognition and 
voice at the global level does not automatically result in effective regional, national or local interventions or 
legislations to improve voice and agency of workers. Regarding IFAs, the reality is that only a few IFAs are 
signed—about 150 (60 are of global nature and 80 are European-based)—and not all are active anymore (Tapia 
et al., 2015). They are motivated from business perspective and not from the workers perspective. 
4. Effectiveness of interventions 
Efforts to strengthen worker representation 
1. In the informal sector  
Common strategies to strengthen informal workers include awareness-building and mobilisation 
around issues, collective bargaining, negotiating and advocacy and (often) legal struggles (Chen 
et al., 2015). Action on these different fronts feeds into others in a circular, interactive, reinforcing 
manner. Common barriers and constraints include an inappropriate or hostile institutional 
environment, competing vested interests and the mindsets of influential stakeholders (Chen et 
al., 2015). There is a role for supportive NGOs or other organisations to help start and 
build the capacity of informal workers’ organisations, but they must learn when and how 
to hand over the leadership and administration of these organisations to leaders elected 
by the membership (Chen et al., 2015). Chen et al. (2015) also highlight the role for 
experienced, informed and committed supporters, including academics, lawyers, urban planners 
and others, to support the legal and policy reform campaigns of these associations. From the 
literature, it can be concluded that the key role for government and international agencies is to 
recognise organisations of informal workers and invite representatives from them to relevant 
policy-making and rule-setting processes.  
Eaton et al. (2017) present nine case studies of successful collective action to strengthen voice 
and agency of informal workers resulting in better recognition, working conditions and wages. All 
case studies show that building alliances or a platform for dialogue and cooperation is 
required, which could include trade unions or not. Efforts to strengthen informal workers’ self-
organisation need to consider the differences between ‘informal wage workers’ and ‘self-
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employed informal workers’. Eaton et al. (2017) argue that traditional unions are not always the 
right vehicle for organising and advocating for informal workers, particularly those who are self-
employed, something that any support for self-organisation should be aware. Cooperatives or 
associations are often a more effective form for raising standards for own account workers 
(Eaton et al., 2017). For example, Brazilian waste pickers have successfully organised 
themselves in cooperatives and street vendors in Liberia are self-organised in associations, 
without direct links with established trade unions (see Box 3).  
Eaton et al. (2017) also argue that too often a strict focus on collective bargaining from 
traditional trade unions excludes informal worker or creates conflicts of interests. As 
Eaton and Schurman (2015) argue in a conference presentation that in cases where member-
based organisations of informal workers actually affiliated with national unions or union 
federations (and some have actually been subsumed under the union), “these relationships are 
fraught with potential conflicts over organisational culture, governance issues and control.” 
Agarwala (2013) argued that informal workers in three Indian states have been most successful 
in improving their lives by essentially giving up on attempting to bargain better pay and standards 
with their employers and instead demanding state-provided social benefits such as housing, 
education and health care. She argued that, in states where the success of at least one political 
party depends on addressing the concerns of the poor (but that that party also supports 
economic liberalisation policies), informal wage workers have been able to succeed in their 
demands for benefits.  
Hence, the needs of informal workers goes beyond collective bargaining on wages and work 
conditions. The necessity of building alliances or a platform for dialogue to negotiate different 
forms of cooperation and affiliation is important because of the interplay between informal 
workers’ associations, trade unions, civil society organisations and governments to organise 
actions for informal workers (Chen et al., 2015). However, trade unions could play an 
important role in strengthening worker associations, often through inclusion of informal 
workers into the legal framework that structures the collective bargaining regime and by 
organising an employing entity with which to bargain. In Uruguay, in particular, the Gender 
Department of the trade union PIT-CNT provided support in re-energising the SUTD after the 
economic crisis of 1998-2002 and has provided ongoing support ranging from use of 
premises and facilities to assistance during negotiations. The assistance with negotiations 
extends to having PIT-CNT leaders participate in the negotiations (Budlender, 2013). Eaton et al. 
(2017) mention the case of hospitality workers in South Africa and mini-bus drivers in Georgia 
who in a complex and timely process became affiliated with trade unions. In the case of South 
Africa, the union accepted a certain level of non-standard employment while also attempting to 
bargain for equity in pay and benefits, while the Georgian trade union collectively bargains for 
drivers regardless of their employment relationship. Elbert (2011) also describes a successful 
campaign to improve the conditions of informal workers in a food processing plant in Argentina. 
The campaign’s success hinged in large part on the support from formal workers and their union. 
Budlender (2013) notes that associations do not usually have experience with collective 
bargaining and may not have a strong tradition of member control. In such cases, leaders 
may negotiate on behalf of members without proper mandates. Budlender (2013; by citing Horn, 
2005) suggests that alliances with trade unions and access to trade union education and training 
on collective bargaining and negotiation can assist in filling these gaps. Affiliation offers the 
potential for access to both education and training and to solidarity and support. On the other 
hand, cooperatives have a good basis for democratic and accountable collective bargaining, 
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while usually better developed administratively and institutionally. This places them in a better 
position to monitor agreements than the less formal associations (Budlender, 2013). 
From the case study on Uruguayan domestic workers self-organisation it can be learnt that for 
success it is not only important to focus on strengthening the organisation of the informal 
workers (e.g. technical assistance, capacity building on leadership, governance trainings), 
but also to the counterpart organisations. In this case, the Sindicato Unico de Trabajadoras 
Domésticas (SUTD) was able to collectively bargain contracts with the ‘housewives league’ (Liga 
de Amas de Casa, Consumidores y Usuarios de la República Oriental del Uruguay) who was 
initiated in 1995 to organise housewives, but was asked by the Uruguayan government in 2008 
to represent the counter organisation in collective bargaining with the domestic workers, 
something they had not anticipated on before (Eaton et al., 2017; Budlender, 2013).  
Box 3. Two case studies on informal worker representation (self-employed) 
Waste Pickers in Brazil. In 2011, bargaining among various stakeholders including government representatives, 
leaders of waste picker cooperative and of NGOs in the Brazilian state of Minas Gerais resulted in the passing of 
the Recycling Bonus Law. The case describes the background to the passage of the law, which established a 
monetary incentive to be paid by the state government to waste pickers who are members of a cooperative or 
workers’ association. It is the first law in the country that authorizes the use of public money for ongoing 
payments for work done by waste pickers. Provision of a monetary incentive aims to reduce loss of reusable 
materials and to supplement the income of waste pickers who primary earn money from selling recyclables within 
specific product markets. Some waste picker advocates view the Bonus law as an important gain in their ongoing 
campaign to become a recognized and formal part of the waste management system while others are afraid it will 
divert waste picker energy away from more important goals such as bidding for solid waste contracts. This case 
also reviews bargaining over the initial implementation of the law.  
Street Vendors in Liberia. Soon after her election as president of Liberia, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf appointed a new 
mayor of the capital Monrovia and gave her an explicit mandate to “clean up” the city and the city administration. 
This included reigning in the activities and locations for street vendors who are alleged to contribute to congestion 
and uncollected garbage in the streets. The case details how street vendors have organized to fight back 
attempts to constrain their activities. Street vendors marched in protest of the repeated harassment from police, 
pushing the mayor to agree to negotiate with them. There have been repeated negotiations between street 
vendors associations and various political authorities. The topics of the negotiations include a formalised 
registration process, continued police harassment and attempts to concentrate vendors in particular plots of land 
in the city. Recently, the negotiations resulted in a formal Memorandum of Understanding.  
(Source: Eaton et al., 2017) 
Several case studies describe how the informal workers received foreign assistance and support 
from various sources. Such support is necessary, particularly, in cases where worker 
representation is new, leaders and members have limited experience of organising, and 
workers with relatively low education are engaging on issues that are highly technical and 
complicated. The need is heightened when the organisation has few, or no, paid officials. The 
Brazil case study on waste pickers provides evidence of strong support from a relatively wide 
range of actors, including the church, environmental NGOs and academics. WIEGO international 
network has also supported waste pickers over the years. One of the early supporters from the 
Catholic Church later became the lead official of the government agency that dealt with waste 
picking in Belo Horizonte, providing a strong internal ally. In many other cases the workers and 
their organisations could draw on assistance from the larger groupings to which they were 
affiliated. Some studies observe that workers may turn to government or big business for 
assistance. However, this support could undermine their independence and their ability to 
represent the interests of their members. In Tbilisi, Georgia, actors higher up in the “vicious 
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scheme” attempted to get the transport drivers on their side and against the municipality. 
However, the drivers decided that their primary interest – to protect their jobs – was better served 
by working with the municipality (Budlender, 2013). 
The ITUC also conducts several project to support informal sector workers. One project covering 
Mali, Senegal and Togo to support trade unions in their efforts to engage with informal workers’ 
associations concluded that self-empowerment capacities of informal workers is often high, 
giving them ownership over their progress is therefore important. Assistance should be tailor-
made, on leadership, awareness raising and increasing capabilities. ITUC also concludes that 
linking assistance not only to governance and organisation, but also in entrepreneurship 
skills in general helps trade unions to increase cooperation and meaningful participation 
with informal workers.4  
2. In the formal sector 
The OECD (2019) reports a significant number of workers that fall in a ‘grey zone’ between the 
usual definition of employee and self-employed. For those workers, who share vulnerabilities with 
salaried employees, and for some self-employed workers in unbalanced power relationships, 
adapting existing regulations to extend collective bargaining rights could be necessary (OECD, 
2019). For instance, several OECD countries have already sought to grant collective 
bargaining rights to some of these workers through tailored interventions in the labour 
law or explicit exemptions to the law prohibiting cartels. 
Strengthening these workers representation often goes through social partners who have 
developed strategies to reach potential members in non-standard forms of work, first in 
challenging workers’ status and classification, but also through lobbying on behalf of non-
standard workers, adapting their bargaining practices to be more inclusive, or engaging in 
initiatives aimed at strengthening these workers’ voice. The OECD (2019) notes that in some 
OECD countries, unions have adapted their legal status to allow self-employed workers to 
become members, while others have created dedicated branches for non-standard 
workers. New independent unions have also been created. However, these initiatives are further 
developed in high-income countries and less in LMICs. With trends in LMICs, in particular in 
emerging economies, similar to high-income countries regarding a surge in ‘grey zone’ mostly 
platform economy workers, exchange of experiences that come from initial interventions 
and channels of organising these workers’ voices should be promoted.   
New channels for representing workers’ interests have been developed, however, while these 
self-organised workers’ organisations can improve links and communication between non-
standard workers, they cannot replace unions (e.g. they do not have the legal mandate to 
bargain collectively on behalf of their members or the ability to deliver on negotiated 
agreements). Instead of refocussing support to trade unions, there is a case that these worker 
organisations can complement unions rather than be a substitute for them; co-operation 
between traditional and new forms of workers’ organisation is now emerging in some 
contexts. Creating the spaces for dialogue and cooperation, therefore, is important as 
Saundry et al. (2012) show in the context of freelance networks in the British audio-visual 
industry. The freelance networks were more successful than unions in creating a sense of 
identity and community among freelance workers, but lacked the resources to achieve industrial 
                                                   
4 Information retrieved from ITUC website https://www.ituc-csi.org/organising-and-training-informal 
20 
relations successes and the legal framework to sign and guarantee the validity and binding 
nature of collective agreements. More generally, the OECD (2019, p.) report stated: “[N]ew forms 
of workers’ organisations can coalesce non-standard workers whom traditional unions have a 
harder time reaching out to, for practical and historical reasons…The combination of efforts from 
both traditional and new actors is necessary to fully address the challenges posed by the 
evolving world of work, and should be encouraged.” 
The digital technology used by platforms can also be mobilised to organise workers and improve 
job quality. One way in which governments could help social partners to seize this 
opportunity would be through the setting up of common knowledge platforms to share 
practices and experiences among actors. However, most digital tools and online communities 
are non-union workers. A good example of this is Turkopticon. Silberman and Irani (2016) show 
that Turkopticon has allowed workers on Amazon Mechanical Turk, a platform where online 
workers are hired for small tasks, to review the “requesters” (individuals or companies posting 
tasks to be executed by workers). It helps workers to identify “bad” requesters, who tend to pay 
late or never, and to find good ones. Other websites facilitating the organisation of workers 
include Coworker.org, which helps workers to create company-specific networks to collect data 
and to aggregate their demands into coherent campaigns (OECD, 2019). 
Strengthening online worker groups starts with increasing incentives to build and 
improve digital technology instant messaging applications, social media groups, online 
fora as well as online polls. They all play a very important role for workers who do not share a 
common physical workplace and lack the ability to discuss work issues face-to-face with each 
other. These technologies allow them to exchange information about clients and tasks, warn 
each other about scams, discuss best practices and set informal price norms, and to co-ordinate 
actions. Such online communities are increasingly a tool to organise micro-workers and online 
freelance workers in countries like Nigeria, South Africa, Kenya, the Philippines, Malaysia and 
Vietnam (Wood et al., 2018). Improving awareness raising and initiating direct support to 
these online communities could be considered.  
While each country’s situation and traditions are different, a well-functioning system of labour 
relations can contribute to shaping a more rewarding and inclusive future of work. According to 
OECD (2019), depending on the national context, policy makers should consider: 
 Promoting national consultations and discussions on the future of work with both social 
partners and other organisations representing workers and employers to establish a joint 
diagnosis about challenges, and share practices among actors on new initiatives and 
technological innovation through common knowledge platforms. 
 Leaving scope for collective bargaining and incentivising self-regulation among actors on 
these issues by making a limited but strategic use of legislative interventions. 
 Ensuring broad-based access to training and lifelong learning by promoting collective 
bargaining over these issues. 
 Accompanying the efforts of unions and employers’ organisations to expand their 
membership to non-standard forms of work and new forms of business without 
discouraging the emergence of other forms of organisation. 
 Enforcing the correct classification of workers’ employment status and fighting 
misclassification is the first step in ensuring that workers have access to collective 
bargaining (there would still be scope for potential adaptation of existing regulations to 
allow collective bargaining for workers).  
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Thorpe et al. (2019) goes further by mention enabling conditions to strengthen meaningful 
participation of workers (and other stakeholders) in firms and other organisations. From their 
analysis of case studies, they mention, among others, the following important factors:  
 Democratising knowledge: Narrow control of knowledge and expertise (e.g. on 
‘technical’ subjects like the economy) often limits participation. Overcoming these barriers 
means recognising ‘experiential knowing’ as the basis of alternative expertise. It also 
means democratising technical knowledge, e.g. through increased transparency and 
information flow, and translation (between languages or from jargon to everyday 
language). People may also access new knowledge, e.g. through engaging technical 
‘experts’ to analyse policy, gather evidence or map the economy, provided that the terms 
for this engagement are set by the users of the information. 
 Working in coalition: There is strength in numbers when working to overcome 
exclusionary economic institutions, e.g. in advocating for change. These efforts can be 
made even more effective through drawing on resources at multiple (local, national and 
global) levels. However, care must be taken that access to new resources through multi-
level networks does not negatively affect power relations and undermine participation. 
 Mobilisation: Workers’ participation implicitly requires people have the awareness, 
capacity and ambition to engage; however, this cannot be taken for granted as a system 
of self-management would not suit all workers. These attributes can be supported 
through links with NGOs or through access to some public funding to raise awareness of 
opportunities, create spaces for deliberation and enable access to new resources.   
Entry points for donor interventions 
For this rapid review some donor evaluations of interventions to strengthen worker 
representation have been included. Some observations from this literature show that the main 
focus of interventions are on export sectors in more industrialised countries, mainly in Asia (e.g. 
Bangladesh, Vietnam). In this sense, interventions mainly focus on formal sector jobs and 
therefore often do not respond to needs and demands for worker/self-employed self-organisation 
in sub-Saharan Africa. Interventions are mainly focussing on capacity building and creating 
dialogues (bi- and tripartite) with traditional stakeholders. Interventions seem increasingly related 
to partnerships in supply chains that involve large companies that are based in the donor’s 
country that also include civil society organisations. 
In the limited time of this rapid review, very few projects or programmes could be identified that 
had a strong focus on using new technologies for worker representation in LMICs. Exception is 
Taylor and Shih (2019) that did a research on interventions that included technologies for 
collecting worker feedback to support corporate responsible sourcing. The study concludes that 
due-diligence-oriented technology tools help control risk in supply-chain hot spots, but rarely 
identified modern slavery due to gaining little trust from workers, and business clients not being 
ready to expose or address modern slavery. Empowerment-oriented worker feedback tools were 
found to regularly identify modern slavery, forced labour, and human trafficking and to assist 
exploited workers, but most had no connection to business’s due diligence (Taylor & Shih, 2019).  
The International Labour Organisation (ILO) is on the global level very active in the worker 
representation. A review of its interventions on social dialogue, noted that a widespread trend in 
interventions across all areas is to seek to enhance the capacity of social partners and promote 
tripartite/bipartite social dialogue at national, regional, sectoral and/or local/enterprise levels (ILO, 
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2017). Overall, capacity-building activities seem to be most recurrent in the promotion of 
tripartism and social dialogue. Activities of this type target mainly bipartite/tripartite constituents, 
bringing together – in some countries or areas of intervention – actors who previously had only 
been engaged separately (ILO, 2017). Activities that promote awareness, recognition of social 
partners and social dialogue mechanisms, as well as institutional capacity, are also widespread. 
Specific attention is paid to contextual factors and conditions, while outcomes related to 
sustainability and gender mainstreaming are taken into account. The ILO review (2017) mentions 
many programmes of different kind of social dialogues that had positive impacts on social 
protection, work conditions and workspace safety, workers’ representation and capacity, gender 
equality and collective bargaining. The ILO has implemented several forms of social dialogue 
interventions in its decent work country programmes. Some important points from this review, are 
(ILO, 2017): 
 Sustainability is an issue, in particularly because of a lack of commitment from 
stakeholders. However, by creating a feeling of ownership and creating project 
interventions, which are clearly linked to the day-to-day mandates/functions of all 
tripartite partners and sector players, programmes and projects could secure political 
commitment and a feeling of ownership by stakeholders to improve industrial relations. 
 In most cases, the main target groups for ILO interventions/activities in the domain of 
social dialogue were ILO tripartite constituents (governments, employers and workers): 
workers’ organisations, employers’ organisations, governments – notably ministries of 
labour – and their relevant agencies, e.g. labour inspectorates, labour administration 
officials. However, in more specific projects, sectoral and/or regional/local stakeholders 
also have to be targeted outside the traditional partners, as were specific groups such as 
women, younger workers or workers in particular sectors. 
 Creating synergies and complementarities with other ILO programmes was also 
recommended. For example, while it cooperated with Better Work and other projects in 
the implementation phase of national plans of action, the Swedish-funded project 
“Promoting Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining in the Rural, Export 
Processing and Domestic Work Sectors” (GLO/11/57/SID) did not sufficiently take into 
account other relevant ILO work in the field of freedom of association and collective 
bargaining. 
Another ILO evaluation in Vietnam’s export sector shows that organising worker representatives 
outside the existing unions on the firm level had the most success in gaining trust and 
improvement in working conditions and wages (Chi, 2012). Less effective were initiatives of 
employee participation through team leaders and through trade unions. The first, because they 
do not represent directly the workers, and the second because of the specifics of distrust with 
trade unions in Vietnam (Chi, 2012).    
On the bilateral level, several donors are involved in worker representation, through employment 
empowerment, worker rights and right of associations, and decent work programmes. A Norway 
and Sweden funded ILO programme on worker representation including multiple developing 
countries, concluded that one of the main advantages of Outcome-Based Funding is the ability to 
be flexible and responsive to the needs of workers’ organisations in developing strength, 
independence and representativeness in a wide variety of economic, political and historic 
contexts. However, this posed a significant challenge for overall programme management. 
Another important point that was made, is industrial peace and civil society cannot be achieved 
23 
through tripartism alone, but has to be supported through activities specifically for workers’ 
organisations (ILO, 2014).  
The Swedish development agency Sida has developed several projects and programmes that 
include social dialogue. In 2016, Sida highlighted their support for social dialogue in its new 
policy framework regarding employment and inclusive economy development strategies. 
Although social dialogue is not new to Swedish development policy, the new policy framework 
highlights its links to both the Global Deal initiative and the ILO Decent Work-agenda. It promotes 
social dialogue on the international and national level through support to different organisations. 
On the global level with the International Labour Organisation (ILO). Other partners are Swedish 
civil society organisations who work at the international level as well as in developing countries. 
These are development NGOs, including the development-cooperation wing of Swedish trade 
unions. Some illustrations of how Sida deals with such interventions (Sida, 2017): 
 Although most bilateral donors are focussing on the formal and exporting sectors, Sida 
has a long term partnership with WIEGO to empower women who work in the informal 
sector. It does this as Sida has recognised that many of their social dialogue 
programmes cannot be successful in many countries in sub-Saharan Africa due to high 
levels of self-employed in the informal economy.  
 Since a few years Sida also has started to support a series of innovative initiatives in 
collaboration with the private sector to engage with them in supply chain. These are so-
called public-private development partnerships (PPDPs) to promote Industrial Relations 
within the textile and garment sector in several countries. Projects are co-funded by Sida 
and large global buyers of ready-made garments like Hennes & Mauritz (H&M). Such 
PPDPs were launched in Cambodia (2014), Ethiopia (2015) and Myanmar (2016). A 
similar initiative, with the same tripartite actors and implemented by the ILO, is the 
Bangladesh Global Deal Project 2015-2020.  
 Sida stimulates in broader employment programmes, focussing on job creation, 
productive employment and decent work, the idea of a social dialogue or worker 
representation. For example, it includes workers voice in productive employment and 
decent work programmes in Ethiopia, Kenya, Mozambique and Tanzania in Africa; and 
Bangladesh and Cambodia in Asia 
 Sida also includes development NGOs in the programmes, for example, in the Swedish 
Workplace HIV/AIDS Programme (SWHAP) (2014-2018) in South Africa and ten other 
countries in Sub-Sahara Africa, to prevent HIV/AIDS among the staff of Swedish related 
companies. SWHAP uses social dialogue – based on partnerships between employers, 
employees and trade unions at company level – as a method for programme 
implementation. This approach has improved relationships at the workplaces, and 
created platforms and tools for dialogue and collaboration on issues beyond those initially 
intended.  
USAID has several projects to enhance worker rights that include their representation. For 
example, USAID funds a project with implementation partner the Solidarity Center in partnership 
with the Vietnam General Confederation of Labour (VGCL) in key export-oriented production 
sectors, including electronics, footwear and leather, garments and textiles, and seafood. The 
project promotes gender equality and strengthens safety and health standards in industrial zones 
and workplaces in major cities around Vietnam. The mid-term evaluation of USAID funded 
Worker Empowerment Programme that is also implemented by the Solidarity Center, supports 
formation of independent worker organisations in Ready Made Garment, and shrimp and fish 
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processing (SFP) industries while strengthening their capacity to defend workers’ rights and 
collectively negotiate with employers in Bangladesh. Another component of this programme 
develops Worker Community Associations (WCA) in targeted factory clusters to help workers 
organise independently to address social and development challenges in their communities. The 
mid-term evaluation shows that through this programme worker participation in these industries 
has increased through establishment of worker associations, inclusion of women employees in 
the worker associations has increased, and awareness on labour rights improved through 
capacity building and trainings (USAID, 2018). However, the evaluation shows some critical 
points: 
 Many unions, once formed, did not remain active due to unfair labour practices and 
factory closures. Some partners criticised support for worker organisers as 
unsustainable. There was also criticism of favouring Trade Union Federations over others 
as partners. 
 There was mixed results of level of trust improvements between employees and 
employers. Also mixed results in results of collective bargaining. 
 Regarding WCAs, they tend to effective facilitate advocacy, improving local government 
responsiveness, and linking community members to social services. However, the WCAs 
that have been formed to date are not sufficiently mature to be sustainable without 
programme assistance.  
 There are signs that WCAs are changing into social enterprises with the risk that, over 
time, these associations will diminish their contributions to workers’ rights in favour of 
becoming self-help groups. 
One of the recommendations of the USAID (2018) evaluation report was: 
“SC [Solidarity Center] should implement programs that convene government and employers 
to facilitate relationship-building. Given the high degree of sensitivity around FOA [Freedom 
of Association], identify less controversial topics, such as worker health and safety, 
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR), and/or other areas where employer and worker 
interests overlap as topics for dialogue. In factories where unions already exist, support more 
workplace cooperation activities and training for middle management” 
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